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Abstract
With the rise of online lenders, the loan stacking problem has
become a significant issue in the financial industry. One of
the key steps in the fight against it is the querying of a bor-
rower’s loan history from peer lenders. This is especially im-
portant in markets without a trusted credit bureau. To protect
participants’ privacy and business interests, we want to hide
borrower identities and lenders’ data from the loan originator,
while simultaneously verifying that the borrower authorizes
the query. In this paper, we propose Octopus, a distributed sys-
tem to execute the query while meeting all the above security
requirements. Theoretically, Octopus is sound. Practically, it
integrates multiple optimizations to reduce communication
and computation overhead. Evaluation shows that Octopus
can run on 800 geographically distributed servers and can
perform a query within about 0.5 seconds on average.
1 Introduction
Within Internet finance, peer-to-peer loan services such as
Lending Club in the US and CreditEase in China seek to pro-
vide accessible and low-cost loans to borrowers, especially to
those who would not otherwise be eligible. These services are
very popular in emerging markets, where traditional banks are
hesitant to lend to people whose credit cannot be verified by
a trusted credit bureau. For example, in China, there are more
than 2000 of loan companies [1]. While they can substitute
alternative data like e-commerce purchases and mobile pay-
ment transaction logs, they lack the most important data: loan
history. Without such information, malicious borrowers can
take out loans from multiple lenders, without the intention of
ever paying them back. This is what is commonly referred to
as the loan stacking problem.
While there are many efforts to build a trusted credit bureau
that tracks all credit transactions, like Experian, Equifax, and
TransUnion in the US, these firms require the trust of the
people. However, for many markets without such a bureau, or
with a bureau only providing limited information [2, 11], it is
difficult to build one because of the trust level people need
to impose on it. In fact, recent data breaches like the Equifax
breach in 2017 [4] raise the question of whether we should
have such bureaus.
In this paper, we propose Octopus, a cryptography-based
solution that reduces the level of trust needed while still meet-
ing the necessary security requirements. To simplify the dis-
cussion, we focus on loan stacking detection: An originator
issues a query to ask as many other lenders as possible about
a borrower’s outstanding loan amount.
Cryptographic approaches, such as [24, 27, 30, 54, 63], do
not depend on trusted third parties, and reveal no private in-
formation other than the pre-negotiated computation results.
However, while applying naive implementations of crypto-
graphic approaches to the loan stacking problem, we face
several challenges: 1) (Authorization) We need to hide the
borrower’s identity and at the same time ensure that the query
is authorized by the anonymous borrower. 2) (Scalability in
the number of users) Cryptographic operations, especially
arithmetical operations on ciphertexts, usually consume sub-
stantial computation resources, thus it is challenging to scale
to millions of users, the typical size of a lender has. 3) (Scala-
bility of the number of lenders) In a large market like China,
there are thousands of lenders we want to gather input from.
These lenders may be dispersed across the country, and com-
municate over public networks. Protocols with high com-
munication cost (e.g. [63]) or too many interactive rounds
(e.g. [30]) will become impractical. 4) (Trust on the borrower
and originator) Both the borrower and originator have an
incentive to lie: the borrower want more loans, while the orig-
inator want to get private information as much as possible.
Thus, we need a protocol to catch liars.
Octopus integrates several security protocols, as well as
system design, to provide a solution for the loan stacking
problem. Our large-scale experiments on over 800 servers
show that Octopus can perform a privacy-preserving query
satisfying the above requirements with about 0.5 seconds on
average. Specifically, the key ideas of Octopus include: 1)
We design all the communications between each pair of par-
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ticipants (including the borrower, the originator and lenders)
to be non-interactive, which means each communication re-
quires at most one round. 2) We adopt private information
retrieval (PIR) [9,24,38] to hide the borrower’s identity in the
query. We extend the protocol to perform differentially pri-
vate information retrieval and fully exploit the sparsity of the
query keyspace to improve query performance. 3) We design
a new protocol that emulates how credit bureaus verify user
identities - using secrets in the query result itself. Thus we can
authenticate the borrower while hiding the borrower’s identity.
4) We prevent both the borrower and query originator from
lying by using homomorphic commitment scheme [27, 54] -
we compute the committed total loan amount collected from
the lenders and check the consistency of the sum with the
borrower’s claim. 5) We support common query functions,
e.g. comparison between the total loan amount and a private
threshold of the originator, enabling the borrower to control
the amount of information released to the originator.
We have the following contributions in the paper:
• We propose Octopus, a system for privacy-preserving loan
stacking detection. Octopus integrates privacy-preserving
aggregation, private information retrieval and anonymous
authorization in a single system. Also, with an asyn-
chronous and minimal-round-complexity communication
protocol, Octopus achieves high efficiency and scalability.
• We design a new protocol which performs differentially
private information retrieval and utilizes the sparsity to
accelerate computation.
• We design a new protocol to enable anonymous authoriza-
tion for recursive PIR queries.
• We implement Octopus and evaluate it in a large-scale,
geographically distributed environment with 800 servers.
The result shows that Octopus can process requests with a
per-request latency of 0.5 seconds on average.
2 Related Work
To our knowledge, before this work, there has not been practi-
cal implementation for privacy-preserving loan stacking detec-
tion yet. On the other hand, there are plenty of works aiming
to address similar or related problems.
Many solutions use cryptographic tools (e.g., secure multi-
party computation) to build privacy-preserving computation
systems. Loan stacking detection can also be easily imple-
mented based on privacy-preserving aggregation (i.e., cal-
culating the sum of several private numbers). Systems like
[15, 19, 25, 31, 45] provide privacy-preserving aggregation for
common tasks. For example, Prio [25] proposes an efficient
approach for servers to aggregate data from mobile clients,
and provides security against malicious clients using non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs. However, these systems
reveal the final aggregation result directly and do not consider
the anonymity and identity authentification of the borrower.
In theory, we can use more general privacy-preserving sys-
tems, such as [14, 30, 46, 46, 62] to compute the aggrega-
tion. However, these works still lack anonymous authoriza-
tion. Also, these systems require synchronous communica-
tion, which introduces unnecessary performance costs. For
similar reasons, existing works for privacy-preserving and
anonymous database query, such as [16], have super-linear
computation complexity, thus not applicable to our case.
While privacy-preserving blockchains are drawing atten-
tion [20,50,52,55], they focus on recording entire transaction
histories on a replicated chain [22]. We focus on querying
distributed (partitioned) loan records.
There are also some solutions based on trusted hardware
(e.g., CPU) for privacy-preserving computation, such as [12,
41, 51, 58]. However, when we use trusted hardware (such as
Intel SGX [26, 57]) for privacy-preserving computation, the
hardware manufacturers (e.g., Intel) are the roots of trust, and
thus should be treated as trusted third parties. In this paper,
we do not assume such trusted third parties, and we focus on
software solutions.
3 System Design
3.1 Problem Formulation
Roles. There are three roles in the loan stacking problem:
a borrower, an originator and n lenders S1,S2, . . . ,Sn. A bor-
rower may borrow money from one or multiple lenders. We
assume that all the lenders form a consortium, which provides
basic services (e.g. user registration and coordination) but
does not touch any private data.
A user interested in the consortium should register with
her real identity. An originator can inquire a registered user’s
loan information from the consortium to make some decisions
(e.g. whether to lend money to the borrower). Note that we
allow a user to register to the consortium without becoming a
borrower, and we also allow borrowers to not register to the
consortium. Registration is not binding because users may
not want to borrow, but simply display their loan credit or take
advantage of other consortium benefits. Registration is not
necessary because borrowers don’t have to share their loan
credits. This flexibility is essential to bootstrap the system
incrementally in an existing loan market. In the following
sections, we use user and borrower interchangeably.
Geographically-distributed participants. Octopus can
serve a large loan market, where participants may be dis-
persed around the world and communicate over the expensive
public Internet. Thus, we need to design the protocol to com-
municate with minimal rounds to reduce latency, and we want
to make all communication asynchronous to tolerate occa-
sional link or server failures.
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Figure 1: The architecture of Octopus.
Functionality goals. Octopus enables the originator to com-
pute the result of queries of the following form:
f (
n
∑
i=1
xib; t), (1)
where xib’s and t are private inputs to the computation. In the
loan stacking problem, t is the private credit limit that the
originator assigns to the borrower, b is the borrower’s identity
hidden from the lenders, xib is the loan balance amount at
lender Si for borrower b. The function f is evaluated collabo-
ratively by the borrower and the originator, e.g. a comparison
∑ni xib < t. A lender Si may perform some local computation
to generate xib from its raw database. For example, the lender
may filter the loan amount and map it to an integer. We ig-
nore this pre-process step as the lenders can perform this
step locally. Note that although we present Octopus under
the loan stacking application in this paper, Eq. 1 is generally
applicable to other widely used queries [15, 45, 52].
3.2 Architecture Overview
Fig. 1 shows the system architecture of Octopus. We introduce
an extra role, exchanger, as a relay for information. It has the
following functionalities: 1) The exchanger buffers encrypted
messages (but cannot decrypt them), so that participants can
communicate asynchronously; 2) It auxiliarily protects the
lenders’ databases by adding noise to the responses from
each lender; 3) It serves as a central registration database
so lenders can synchronize it periodically. To hide the bor-
rower’s identity, we use anonymous channels (e.g. Tor [7])
for communication between the borrower and the exchanger.
As an optimization, we let the roles pre-share some secrets
to enhance efficiency and security. For example, when user
u registers with the exchanger, she shares a random secret
string τeu with the exchanger. When a borrower b borrows
money from Si, Si shares with b not only the loan amount xib
but also a random secret string τib. τib can be used as the seed
for generating commitment randomness. Of course, if a user
u′ has not borrowed money from Si, we do not assume any
shared secret between u′ and Si.
3.3 Security Goals
At a high-level, the main goal of Octopus is to provide privacy-
preserving evaluation of loan stacking. On the borrower and
originator side, we have the following goals:
[Privacy-B] Other than the result of Eq. 1, the originator learns
no information about xib.
[Privacy-O] The originator keeps the credit limit t private, as
each lender evaluates t with her own proprietary algorithm.
[Anonymity] The originator hides the borrower’s identity b
from other parties, in order to prevent others from compet-
ing for the customer. In this paper, we make the borrower’s
identity computationally indistinguishable from a group of Ng
users. A large enough Ng (e.g., 10,000) practically conceals
the borrower’s identity.
In addition, the lenders need two requirements:
i) [Privacy-L] A lender Si may lend money to many borrowers.
Thus, in addition to xib, Si should keep information about
other borrowers private. More formally, for each borrower b′,
denoting Iib′ as the indicator that xib′ 6= 0, we ensure that Iib′
is (ε,δ)-differentially private to the originator, and protect the
exact value of xib′ when xib′ 6= 0.
ii) [Authorization] As the borrower communicates with the
exchanger anonymously and her identity is hidden, an attacker
can pretend to be that borrower and collude with the originator
to learn about the borrower’s loan information (see details in
Section 6). We thus need anonymous authorization: the bor-
rower and the originator should collaboratively prove that the
borrower who communicates with the exchange anonymously
is exactly the one who is queried by the originator.
3.4 Threat Model
We assume that the exchanger is semi-honest, i.e., the ex-
changer follows the protocol and does not collude with others,
but it is curious about participants’ private data. We also as-
sume that the lenders are semi-honest. But we assume that the
borrower is malicious, i.e., she may lie about her loan history
or ideneity. We also assume that the originator is malicious,
as it may send invalid or unauthorized queries to get private
information that is not supposed to be revealed to it. A no-
table thing is that we assume the borrower and the originator
may collude. We assume an adversary who can monitor all
the traffic and control all the connections in the network, in
the condition that all the communication is based on secure
channels (e.g. SSL). Finally, we assume that the anonymous
channels (e.g., Tor) are secure and untraceable.
Octopus is based on standard cryptographic assumptions.
We assume secure public-key cryptography systems, homo-
morphic commitment schemes and pseudo-random functions.
Finally, we assume that the originator has a public-secret key
pair (pko,sko) and pko is known to all participants.
3
4 Solution Overview
In this section, we first introduce some cryptographic prelimi-
naries for readers unfamiliar with this field, then demonstrate
the high-level workflow of Octopus.
4.1 Preliminaries
Homomorphic commitment. To hide the values of xib’s, we
use the Pedersen commitment scheme [54]. Given two large
primes p and q such that q|p−1, we assume that Gq is a sub-
group in Zp of order q. Let g and h be two random generators
of Gq, and define the commitment function as F(x,r) = gxhr
mod p, where x ∈ Zq is the committed number and r ∈ Zq
is a random number. In this paper, we sometimes abbreviate
F(x,r) as F(x). The commitment function F is additively
homomorphic: given two commitments c1 = F(x1,r1) and
c2 = F(x2,r2), c1c2 is a commitment that commits to x1+ x2.
A commitment reveals nothing about the committed value.
Moreover, a commitment can be opened in only one way.
In Octopus, each lender Si commits xib to F(xib), and the
originator cannot open the commitment without ri.
Pseudo-random function. A pseudo-random function (PRF)
is computationally indistinguishable from a truly random
function [35]. We denote PRFs(x) as a PRF function that uses
s as the seed and takes x as the input.
Private information retrieval. We use private information
retrieval (PIR) [24] to hide the borrower’s identity b. In PIR,
there is a sender holding a database consisting of m items
{e1,e2, . . . ,em}, and a receiver who issues an encrypted query
to the database to retrieve an item ek without revealing the
index k to the sender. A symmetric PIR [60] further protects
the privacy of the sender, i.e., the receiver learner no more
information about the database than ek.
Paillier cryptosystem. Paillier is a public key cryptosys-
tem based on the decisional composite residuosity assump-
tion [53]. Given two large primes p,q such that gcd(pq,(p−
1)(q− 1)) = 1, we let n = pq and g be a random integer
where g ∈ Z∗n2 . To encrypt a message x ∈ Zn, we pick a ran-
dom integer r ∈ Zn and set the ciphertext as E(x) = gxrn
mod n2. It is easy to see that Paillier encryption is additively
homomorphic: E(x1)E(x2) = E(x1 + x2). Another property
of Paillier is E(x1)x2 = E(x1x2). We use  and  to repre-
sent homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication
respectively. For Paillier, E(x1)E(x2) means E(x1)E(x2),
while E(x1) x2 means E(x1)x2 .
Differential privacy. Differential privacy is a rigorous and
strong privacy notion [32]. Formally, an algorithm K gives
(ε,δ)-differential privacy if for all adjacent datasets D, D′ and
all S ⊆ Range(K), we have Pr[K(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε ·Pr[K(D′) ∈
S]+δ, where adjacent datasets are two datasets that differ in at
most a single record. A common method to achieve differen-
tial privacy is to add noise following Laplace distribution [40].
In this paper, we denote a Laplace distribution with mean µ
and variance 2λ2 as Lap(µ,λ).
4.2 Solution Overview
Octopus evaluates the query with three logical processes:
Process 1: Secure aggregation. In this process, the origina-
tor needs to get the commitment to ∑i xib without violating
privacy requirements. Concretely, the originator uses PIR to
collect the commitment to xib from each lender Si, and checks
whether the commitment to x = ∑i xib provided by the bor-
rower is consistent with the commitments from the lenders.
Process 2: Anonymous authorization. Since the borrower
b and the exchanger communicate anonymously, there needs
to be a way for the exchanger to verify the query is authorized
by the borrower. In addition, the originator should prove that
the PIR query it sends is valid. Only after both are verified, can
the originator receive the PIR responses from the exchanger
and finish the consistency check in Process 1.
Process 3: Secure evaluation. The final goal of the origi-
nator is to evaluate a function of the form in Eq. 1 on the
encrypted aggregation (sometimes with its own private in-
put) to get the information helpful for its decision. We can
use ZKP or MPC techniques to enable the borrower and the
originator to perform such evaluation.
We emphasize that we run the three processes in parallel,
i.e., process 2 and 3 can start without waiting for process 1
to finish. The parallelism reduces the communication rounds
and thus computation time.
5 Process 1: Secure Aggregation
In this process, the originator aggregates information from
lenders to evaluate ∑i xib in Eq. 1, subject to the privacy re-
quirements in Section 3.3.
Octopus uses homomorphic commitment scheme to hide
the committed data, meeting [Privacy-B]. Also, we design a
differentially private PIR protocol to ensure Privacy-L and
Anonymity. In a high-level view, each lender first generates
commitments for its borrowers’ data, then the originator uses
PIR to retrieve the commitments for the borrower from each
lender. Then the originator aggregates the commitments and
checks the consistency between the aggregated commitment
and the one from the borrower to detect possible liars. As
optimizations, we exploit the sparsity of the lenders’ databases
to accelerate the computation and let the exchanger generate
noise commitments for stronger privacy.
5.1 User Grouping
We use private information retrieval (PIR) [24] to hide the
borrower’s identity. Theoretically speaking, we can perform
PIR on all the registered users. However, this is not scalable
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to hundreds of millions of potential users. To address this
problem, we divide the registered users into several groups of
equal size, and only perform PIR on the corresponding group
each time, such that the lenders cannot distinguish a user from
others in the same group. This design is a trade-off between
efficiency and privacy. We believe that as long as the group
size is large enough, we can achieve adequate privacy.
Specifically, let us assume that there are N registered users,
and these users are divided into several groups of size Ng.
For a registered user with identity u, the exchanger assigns a
unique tuple (gidu, pidu) to the user, where gidu is the group
id and pidu is the position of the user in the group. It is obvious
that 0 ≤ gidu < dN/Nge and 0 ≤ pidu < Ng. For each gid,
every lender allocates an array of size Ng, and puts a registered
borrower u with that gid at position pidu. A PIR query is
performed on the group where the borrower locates, reventing
the lenders from distinguishing the current borrowers from
the other Ng−1 registered users in the same group.
The lenders can synchronize the group ids and user position
ids of newly registered users periodically (e.g. daily), and each
lender only keeps the information of its own borrowers. As
we have mentioned, it is not necessary for a registered user
to have borrowed money, nor is it necessary for a borrower
to register with the exchanger. Thus the synchronization does
not lead to any extra privacy issues.
5.2 Differentially Private Information Re-
trieval Utilizing Sparsity (DSPIR)
We need a PIR scheme with low communication complex-
ity and practical assumptions. We use computationally PIR
(cPIR), which assumes that the participants are limited to
probabilistic polynomial-time computations [42], and does
not need data replication or multiple rounds like [23, 24]. We
choose Paillier as the cryptosystem of cPIR in Octopus.
Naive PIR. In PIR terminology, we denote receiver as the
one who sends encrypted queries and receives retrieved data,
and sender as the one who holds a database and sends re-
sponses to receivers. In Octopus, the originator is the receiver
and every lender is a sender. Assuming that a sender holds a
database with m items {e1,e2, . . . ,em} and the receiver wants
to retrieve ek, the naive PIR protocol using Paillier cryp-
tosystem works as follows: 1) The receiver sends a query
q = {q1,q2, . . . ,qm} to the sender, where qi is a ciphertext of
1 if i = k, or a ciphertext of 0 otherwise. 2) Upon receiving q
from the receiver, the sender calculates c =∏mi q
ei
i and sends
c to the receiver. 3) The receiver decrypts c and gets ek. Step 2
utilizes the homomorphism of the Paillier cryptosystem. This
simple protocol is easy to implement, but is not practical in
our situatioin: since the originator’s query size is O(m), the
naive protocol has high communication cost.
Recursive PIR. To reduce the communication overhead,
we can perform PIR recursively [9, 43], i.e., to query the
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Figure 2: Examples of recursive PIR.
k-th item out of a list of m items, if m can be factorized to
m1×m2×·· ·×md , the receiver can generate a d-dimensional
query q = {{q11,q12, . . . ,q1m1},{q21,q22, . . . ,q2m2}, . . . ,
{qd1,qd2, . . . ,qdmd}}, where qi j is a ciphertext of 1 if the k-
th item falls into the position j of the i-th dimension, or a
ciphertext of 0 otherwise. Then the receiver only needs to
send ∑di=1 mi ciphertexts to the sender, while the receiver
should send m =∏di=1 mi ciphertexts in a non-recursion ver-
sion. Fig. 2(a) shows an example. To retrieve a23, the receiver
sends 3+4 = 7 ciphertexts. The sender first retrieves the 2nd
row, then retrieves the 3rd column from the retrieved row.
The expansion factor, or the ratio of the size of ciphertext to
the size of plaintext, also affects the communication cost. For
example, 1024-bit Paillier encrypts a 1024-bit plaintext to a
2048-bit ciphertext, so the expansion factor is f = 2. It can be
seen that for a d-dimensional recursive PIR query, the expan-
sion factor is f d . Therefore, for l-bit Paillier, which means the
bit-length of the plaintext is l, the total communication cost
of a d-dimensional recursive PIR query is (∑di=1 mi + f d)l.
Thus we can choose proper cryptosystems (e.g. Paillier) and
parameters (e.g. d and mi’s) to minimize communication cost.
Sparsity-aware PIR - first version. As each lender Si only
stores loan information of its own borrowers, its array of
the borrowers’ information is likely to be very sparse for all
groups. For example, if only 1/10 of people have borrowed
money from lenders, the sparsity, or the ratio of the empty
items, of most lenders will be over 0.9. Octopus utilizes the
sparsity to accelerate the PIR with a simple idea: just skip the
empty items when generating responses.
Specifically, for a sparse array A with m items, assume
that m′ of the items are non-empty (in our situation, this
means m = Ng and only m′ users of a group have borrowed
money from that lender). We represent A as {ind1 : a1, ind2 :
a2, . . . , indm′ : am′}, where each (ind j,a j)(1 ≤ j ≤ m′) is an
index-value pair. In this paper, each ind j corresponds to a
pid, while each a j corresponds to a commitment to some xib.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the sparsity-aware PIR algorithm
run at the lenders. Intuitively, for an array A∗ of size m∗, if we
want to retrieve the item at position ind, we can first aggre-
gate every row_len items into a group and treat the array as a
row_len× (m∗/row_len) matrix (line 4). Next, we calculate
the coordinate of A∗[ind] and denote it as (r,c) (line 7-8), then
retrieve the r-th row. Next, we apply this process recursively
to retrieve the c-th item of the retrieved row (line 3 to line
17). We skip the empty items to reduce computation overhead
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Figure 3: Examples of PIR utilizing sparsity.
(line 6-12). Finally, the algorithm returns the retrieved item.
The computation complexity is proportional to the number
of non-empty items (i.e., the number of registered users who
have borrowed money from the lender). Although the idea is
straightforward, there remain two issues:
First, as the sender skips empty items, the receiver can
deduce extra information about the array by comparing the
result ciphertext to certain numbers. For example, Fig. 2(a)
shows a 3×4 array, of which all items are non-empty, while
in Fig. 2(b), the 3rd column only contains the inquired item
a23. For Fig. 2(a), when the sender retrieves the 2nd row,
as qi j = gxi j rni j where xi j = 0 or 1, the sender gets E(a23) =
ga23(ra1311 r
a23
12 r
a33
13 )
n. However, for Fig. 2(b), when the sender re-
trieves the 2nd row, the sender gets E(a23)= ga23(r
a23
12 )
n. Thus,
after receiving E(E(a23)), the receiver first decrypts the out-
ermost encryption and gets E(a23). By comparing ga23(r
a23
12 )
n
and E(a23), the receiver can deduce whether the 3rd column
contains other non-empty items or not.
Second, the receiver can deduce extra information by check-
ing whether the decryption returns 0. For example, a query for
Fiq. 3(a) returns E(E(0)). This is because a23 is empty and
thus skipped. Similarly, a query for Fig. 3(b) returns E(01),
where 01 is a 0 string whose the length equals to the length
of a ciphertext (e.g. 2048 bits for Paillier with a 1024-bit
private key). Fig. 3(c) shows an entirely empty array, and
we set 0 as the output (line 19 in Algorithm 1). Generally,
with a d-dimensional query for retrieving an item e, there are
d+2 possibilities for the result of Algorithm 1: 0, E(0d−1),
E2(0d−2), . . . , Ed−i(0i), . . . , Ed−1(01), Ed(0), Ed(e), where
Ei(·) = E(Ei−1(·)) and 0i is a 0 string of the same length
as E(0i−1). Although these ciphertexts are of equal length,
the receiver can decrypt them and discover their types. Thus,
different kinds of arrays result in different kinds of outputs,
revealing extra information.
We address the first issue by introducing extra randomness
to the result. In line 16, we add a random ciphertext of 0,
i.e. rn, to mask each ciphertext. Thus, under the decisional
composite residuosity assumption [53], the receiver cannot
infer extra information from the ciphertexts without knowing
the values of the introduced randomness.
Enhancing security with noise responses. Our solution to
the second issue is more involved. We let the exchanger in-
troduce perturbations: the exchanger adds noise responses to
the lenders’ responses, to make the originator unable to dis-
tinguish the response type of a lender. Apart from 0, the other
Algorithm 1: Sparsity-aware PIR algorithm.
Input: The query q = {{q11,q12, . . . ,q1m1},{q21,q22,
. . . ,q2m2}, . . . ,{qd1,qd2, . . . ,qdmd }}, the query dimension d, and the
sparse array/dataset A = {ind1 : a1, ind2 : a2, . . . , indm′ : am′}.
Output: The cipertext of the queried item.
1 Let A∗ = {ind∗1 : a∗1, ind∗2 : a∗2, . . . , ind∗m′∗ : a∗m′∗} be a copy of A.
2 Initialize m∗ as the capacity of A∗ (i.e. m∗ := m) and m′∗ as the number
of non-empty items in A∗ (i.e. m′∗ := m′).
3 for i = 1; i≤ d; i = i+1 do
4 row_len = m∗/mi
5 tmp_A∗ = empty_set()
6 for j = 1; j ≤ m′∗; j = j+1 do
7 r = bind∗j /row_lenc
8 c = ind∗j mod row_len
9 if tmp_A∗[c] is empty then
10 tmp_A∗.append(c : qira∗j)
11 else
12 tmp_A∗[c] = tmp_A∗[c] (qira∗j)
13 for (ind,a) ∈ tmp_A∗ do
14 tmp_A∗[ind] = tmp_A∗[ind]E(0)
15 Assign A∗ = tmp_A∗
16 m∗ = m∗/mi
17 m′∗ = tmp_A∗.non_empty_count()
18 if A∗ is empty then
19 return 0
20 else
21 return the item in A∗
possible outputs of Algorithm 1 are of equal length. To pre-
vent the exchanger from learning additional information from
the outputs, the lenders replace the output 0 with E(0d−1). For
i = 1,2, . . . ,d, we say that a response is of type i if it is of the
form Ed−i(0i). And we say a response is of type 0 if it is a ci-
phertext of a commitment, i.e. Ed(F(x)). Then the exchanger
generates noise responses of these types. The noise responses
of type 1 to type d can be generated directly by the exchanger
using the public key of the originator. To hide the number of
responses of type 0, the exchanger generates commitments to
0, namely F(0), and then encrypts each of them as Ed(F(0)).
As long as the originator cannot distinguish commitments to 0
from other commitments, it cannot tell whether a commitment
is from the exchanger or the lenders. Meanwhile, as the noise
responses are ciphertexts of 0 strings or commitments to 0,
they do not affect the final computation result.
Specifically, the exchanger adds Laplace noise to achieve
differential privacy [32]. The type count the originator gets
can be represented as a vector~v = (n0,n1, . . . ,ndˆ), where dˆ is
the number of possible response types (dˆ = d in the simple
case) and ni is the number of responses of type i (0≤ i≤ dˆ).
We first consider a simple case where a newcoming originator
sends a query without any prior knowledge of the dataset. The
following theorem states how much noise is required in this
case (see Appendix B for the proof):
Theorem 1. If the exchanger generates n˜i noise responses of
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type i(0≤ i≤ dˆ), where n˜i ∼ dmax(0,Lap(µ,λ))e for each i,
then the exchanger makes the type of the response from each
lender (ε,δ)-differentially private to the originator, where
ε= 2λ and δ= e
1−µ
λ (1− 14 e
1−µ
λ ).
In general cases, however, the type count vector ~v is not
enough, due to two reasons: 1) an originator may keep in-
quiring about a specific borrower’s information for multiple
times; 2) an originator may inquire multiple borrowers within
a single group to get more information of that group. This
means that the change of the loan information between a
borrower and a lender affects not only the borrower’s type
counts but also other borrowers’ type vectors. Actually, if
we assume that an originator would repeat the query on a
borrower for at most k times, then the worst case would be
~v = (~vk1,~v
k
2, . . . ,~v
k
m). Futhermore, if there are at most l borrow-
ers whose type vectors may be affected by a specific borrower,
then at most lk queries of an originator would be affected by
a specific borrower. To still achieve (ε,δ)-differential privacy,
we can then split the privacy budget ε and δ equally to the
lk queries. However, such split scheme makes the average
and standard variance of the amount of the noise that follows
dmax(0,Lap(µ,λ))e grow linearly with lk. We thus should
reduce l to improve the overall performance. Specifically, we
have the following theorem (proof in Appendix C):
Theorem 2. If an originator may inquire m borrowers using
Algorithm 1 with d-dimensional PIR queries and would in-
quire each borrower for at most k times, then we have:
a) l ≤ m(d−1)/d;
b) if we replace all the empty items with Ed−s(0s)’s after the
s-th iteration (1≤ s≤ d), then l ≤ m(s−1)/d and dˆ = s.
We can see from b) in Theorem 2 that the smaller s is,
the more computation the lenders take, but the fewer noise
responses are needs as the privacy budgets ε and δ become
larger and dˆ becomes smaller. This is because the empty
items are replaced with Ed−s(0s)’s at the s-th iteration and
thus cannot be skipped, meanwhile the number of noise types
the exchanger generates grows with s. In this paper we call s
the replace iteration. One notable point is that if we set s = 1,
then l ≤ 1, which means that we only need to take the inquired
borrower himself into account, which reduces to Theorem 1.
PRF for generating randomness. We use a PRF to gener-
ate randomness for the commitments. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.2, as long as u has borrowed money from Si, they share
a secret string τiu and a number xiu. The PRF uses τiu as seed
and takes a string containing xiu as input, and outputs the
randomness riu. Thus u and Si can privately share the ran-
domness without communication. We summarize our secure
aggregation protocol (denoted by Πagg) in Appendix D.
6 Process 2: Anonymous Authorization
The above protocol is enough for a semi-honest originator to
aggregate the commitments if the originator follows the pro-
tocol. However, the originator may deviate from the protocol
by faking queries that violate Privacy-L and Authorization.
There are two ways that the originator can cheat the exchanger
and the lenders: invalid queries and unauthorized queries.
Non-interactive ZKP for query validity. We define a recur-
sive PIR query as valid iff the subquery of each dimension
i, i.e. {qi1,qi2, . . . ,qimi}, contains exactly one 1 and mi− 1
0’s. As the query is encrypted, a malicious originator can
send a query with more 1’s to retrieve information on other
borrowers. To avoid such an attack, we use ZKP to prove
two constraints for each dimension i of the query: a) each
qi j( j = 1,2, . . . ,mi) encrypts either 0 or 1; and b) ∏mij qi j en-
crypts 1. Appendix E provides the formal description and
proof. It is easy to verify that these two constraints indicate
that the subquery of dimension i is valid, thus the entire query.
We also use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [34] to make the above
proof non-interactive. In Octopus, the exchanger verifies the
proofs and rejects the query if the verification fails.
Authorization the query anonymously. Another subsistent
issue is unauthorized queries: a malicious originator can in-
quire loan information of a borrower b without her permission.
For example, the originator can first find a pretender b′ to per-
form as b. Then the originator initiates a query about b. As
b′ communicates with the exchanger anonymously, no one
except the originator knows the identity of b′. The originator,
though not able to open the commitments from the lenders,
can deduce how many lenders b has borrowed money from
as follows: As steps e and f in Protocol 1 show, the bor-
rower sends ∆rb to the exchanger and the exchanger sends
∆r = ∆rb− rz to the originator, thus if the pretender b′ col-
ludes with the originator, the originator actually knows the
value of ∆rb and can recover rz as rz = ∆rb−∆r. Also, as the
noise commitments all commit to 0, with the set C got in step
g, the originator can find a subset Csub ⊂C such that rz opens
∏ci∈Csubci to 0. Finally, the originator gets to know that there
are
∣∣C−Csub∣∣ lenders who have lent money to b.
Thus, our goal is to make sure that the exchanger knows
that the “borrower” communicating with it is actually the bor-
rower that the originator is inquiring about. Existing proving
schemes for identity, such as [13, 21, 33], require the prover
to reveal her identity to the verifier. Also, membership ZKP
schemes, such as [48, 56, 65], only prove that a player is one
of the members in a specific group, but cannot distinguish
b and b′ when b′ is also a legit registered user in the same
group. Our solution is intuitive: the exchanger first uses the
PIR query on the dataset TE = {τeu} where τeu is a secret
number shared between the exchanger and a user u in that
group, to retrieve the current borrower’s secret, and then asks
the borrower and the originator to collaboratively prove that
the anonymous borrower knows the retrieved secret. As the
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Figure 4: An example of anonymous authorization.
secret retrieved by the exchanger is encrypted, the borrower’s
identity is still kept secret from the exchanger.
Specifically, given the borrower’s identity b, if the ex-
changer directly performs PIR using a d-dimensional query,
it gets Ed(τeb), and the borrower should prove that she knows
the plaintext of Ed(τeb) without revealing her identity. When
d = 1, in the Paillier encryption scheme, the proving process
can be accomplished using the approach in [6]. When d > 1,
however, it is non-trivial to construct an efficient proof for the
statement. We thus propose an efficient new protocol for prov-
ing the knowledge of the plaintext of a ciphertext generated
by a recursive PIR query. While the exchanger issuing PIR
queries along each dimension, we require the borrower and
the originator to convince the exchanger that for dimension
i(1≤ i≤ d), the secret the borrower knows, τeb, is in the items
retrieved by the subquery of dimension i. In this situation, the
ciphertexts produced by each subquery have only one layer
of encryption, thus we can use existing cryptographic tools
to prove the above claim. Here “performing PIR along each
dimension respectively” means that we treat an array of m
items as a d-dimensional array with shape m1×m2×·· ·×md ,
and for each dimension i, we use the subquery of that dimen-
sion to retrieve m/mi items. If the borrower really knows a
secret number that can be retrieved by every subquery, then
we can conclude that the secret she knows is exactly the item
the recursive PIR query retrieves, as no other items are in the
intersection of all the subqueries. Appendix F provides the
formal description and analysis of the protocol.
Fig. 4 uses a 2-D query on a 3×4 array A to illustrate the
process. The borrower, who holds a23, first sends a ciphertext
c = E(a23) to the exchanger along with the corresponding
proof that she knows the plaintext of c. Then for dimension
1, the exchanger uses the subquery {q11,q12,q13} and gets
(c∗11,c
∗
12,c
∗
13,c
∗
14), which encrypts the 2nd row. And as a23
is in the 2nd row, the borrower can prove to the exchanger
that the secret encrypted in c is also encrypted in one of
c∗11,c
∗
12,c
∗
13,c
∗
14. Similarly, for dimension 2, the exchanger
retrieves the 3rd column and the borrower proves that one of
c∗21,c
∗
22,c
∗
23 encrypts the same number as c. Thus, the secret
encrypted in c is in both the 2nd row and the 3rd column,
which indicates that the borrower knows a23.
Newly generated random numbers. Instead of using τeu’s
directly for PIR, we use τeu’s as seeds to generate new pseudo-
random numbers for each query to prevent the leakage of τeu’s.
We formalize the anonymous authorization protocol (denoted
by Πauth) in Appendix G.
7 Process 3: Secure Evaluation
The third process is to enable the borrower and the origina-
tor to securely evaluate function f in Eq. 1. The output of f
is based on the aggregation of xib, but unlike some existing
work such as [25, 45] which reveal the aggregation results
(i.e. ∑i xib) directly, Octopus also supports further operations
on ∑i xib and the originator’s private data t without revealing
∑i xib and t. We use ZKP and non-interactive actively secure
computation (NISC) [8] to achieve this goal. Both ZKP and
NISC is based on the commitment that the borrower has sent
to the originator for consistency check at the beginning of
secure aggregation, Note that, although all the communication
between the borrower and the originator is through the ex-
changer, we omit the exchanger in this section for simplicity,
as the exchanger only relays messages.
Octopus supports several kinds of queries, including 1)
sum-based queries such as sum and count; 2) queries contain-
ing multiplication gates, such as variance; and 3) non-linear
functions such as comparison. We briefly introduce how we
implement these queries.
Sum. The implementation for the sum query is direct: the
borrower only needs to open the aggregated commitment in
Process 1 and reveals ∑i xib to the originator.
Count. The count query tells the originator how many lenders
have lent money to the borrower. It can be computed by re-
placing the loan amount with 1 if xib > 0, or 0 otherwise.
Variance. The variance of xib’s can be calculated as
( 1n ∑i x
2
ib)− ( 1n ∑i xib)2. Intuitively, the originator can first get
the commitment to∑i x2ib (denoted by F1) and the commitment
to (∑i xib)2 (denoted by F2), then the originator calculates
F3 =Fn1 F
−1
2 , which is the commitment to (n∑i x
2
ib)−(∑i xib)2,
and opens F3 with the help of the borrower. The originator can
obtain F1 by collecting the commitments to x2ib’s. However, it
is tricky to get F2 using the commitments from the lenders,
as the commitment scheme is not multiplicatively homo-
morphic. [25] calculates the variance by revealing ( 1n ∑i x
2
ib)
and ( 1n ∑i xib)
2 directly, but it leaks extra information beyond
the variance. Octopus uses the multiplication ZKP [27] that
proves that a committed number is the product of the two num-
bers in another two commitments, and thus only reveals the
final variance. Specifically, to get the commitment to (∑i xib)2,
the originator first uses secure aggregation to retrieve the com-
mitment to ∑i xib (denoted as F4), while the borrower sends F2
(i.e. the commitment to (∑i xib)2) along with the proof which
proves to the originator that the number committed in F2 is the
square of the number committed in F4. Once the originator
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verifies that F2 is the commitment to (∑i xib)2, it can obtain
the variance using F1 and F2.
Comparison to a public number. Consider a case where the
originator is willing to make the credit limit t public. Then f is
the comparison function which evaluates whether∑ni=1 xib > t.
We use the interval ZKP [17], which proves that a committed
number lies in a public interval. The interval ZKP is efficient
and non-interactive. In Octopus, the borrower sends the proof
to the originator and then the originator verifies the proof to
get the comparison result.
Comparison to a private number. In a more realistic set-
ting, the originator also wants to hide t. If we assume semi-
honest borrower and originator, we can directly apply garbled
circuit (GC) [63] to perform the comparison. However, both
the borrower and the originator have the incentive to deviate
from the protocol and to lie. We thus use the non-interactive
actively secure computation (NISC) scheme in [8] to support
such queries. The NISC scheme provides active security for
GC using cut-and-choose [47]. Also, we employ common
optimizations for GC, such as free-xor [39] and half-and [64].
We make a small modification: although the protocol in [8]
generates input commitments to prove the consistency of
inputs of different circuits, in our scenario, however, the orig-
inator needs to make sure that the input commitments for
secure computation are also consistent with the commitment
in the consistency check process, otherwise the borrower is
still able to use a fake input for secure comparison to cheat
the originator. Thus, in Octopus, the borrower also needs to
prove consistency. Specifically, in [8], the circuit generator
(namely the borrower in this paper) generates an input com-
mitment c j for the j-th bit of her input. Then the borrower
in Octopus generate proofs for two constraints: a) each c j
commits either 0 or 1; b) c=∏c2
j
j commits the same number
as the commitment in the aggregation process. The borrower
sends the proofs to the originator through the exchanger, and
the originator verifies them to get the comparison result.
8 Security Analysis
For the formal security analysis, we construct simulators for
the participants and prove the indistinguishability between
the real view and the simulated view in each single subprocol,
then analyze the security of the composition of the subpro-
tocols. Briefly speaking, we first see that in Πauth, the partic-
ipants only receives zero-knowledge proofs, commitments,
ciphertexts or random numbers, which reveal no information
about the others’ original inputs and can be simulated by the
simulators, thus achieving the indistinguishability. And the
zero-knowledge proofs help to detect malicious originators
and borrowers. We then prove that with the functionality of
Πauth, Πagg also provides security and uses the commitment
scheme to detect malicious borrowers. Finally, with the com-
position of Πauth and Πagg, we show the security of the whole
protocol. We further argue that we achieve the security goals
in Section 3.3. Please see Appendix H for details.
In addition, we consider an adversary who controls all the
connections and monitors all the traffic in Octopus. As we
assume that all the communications use secure channels (e.g.
SSL) and all transferred data is in encrypted or committed ver-
sion, the adversary cannot infer any information by observing
the messages or the sizes of messages in the channels. An-
other possible attack for the adversary is to block connections
and observe the result. However, blocking the borrower or
the originator makes no sense, as the protocol aborts if either
of them is blocked and there would be no observable plain
variables for the adversary. Blocking one or more lenders
does not hurt the security of Octopus either, as the exchanger
perturbs the responses from the lenders using noise before the
responses are decrypted. So we can conclude that Octopus is
also secure against such adversaries.
A notable thing is that, the computation overhead of each
lender is proportional to the number of its registered borrow-
ers. One may argue that such design is vulnerable to timing
attack [18, 44]. But we do not think this as a problem in Octo-
pus, due to the following reasons: 1) The lenders can wait for
a random period of time before sending data out to prevent
the adversaries from capturing the relation between time and
count; 2) Different lenders use different infrastructure to per-
form the computation, thus longer time does not necessarily
mean more non-empty items. 3) The rough number of users
of a lender sometimes is not privacy, as public materials such
as financial reports may also reveal such information.
9 Evaluation
9.1 Implementation and Testbed Setup
We implement Octopus prototype with about 4,200 lines of
C++ code. We use OpenMP [29] to parallelize the compu-
tation. To support big integers, we use the GMP library [5].
We use the Crypto++ library [3] for common cryptographic
tools, such as SHA256 and AES.
We use the method in [49] to generate the parameters g
and h for the commitment function, while using the method
in [37] to implement PRFs. Also, we use 1024-bit Paillier for
PIR. To reduce the time for online computation, the exchanger
generates noise responses offline for different originators. We
use the secure socket layer (SSL) to add security and use
Tor [7] to add anonymity to the communication channels
between the borrower and exchanger.
Finally, we run our experiments on Amazon EC2 virtual
machines. All nodes are of type c5.2xlarge with 8 Intel
Xeon Platinum 8000-series CPU cores and 16 GB RAM. Each
node runs 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 with 4.4.0 kernel. Each role of
Octopus runs in a separate EC2 node in our experiments. To
evaluate the scalability of Octopus, we scale the number of
lenders up to 800, which means 803 virtual machines in total
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(800 lenders + 1 borrower + 1 originator + 1 exchanger).
9.2 Configuration parameters.
There are many configuration parameters to set in Octopus’s
processes 1-3. We first summarize them here and we make
comprehensive evaluations on their effects in this section.
PIR parameters. Recall that we perform recursive PIR on a
group of Ng members. We set Ng = 10,000 in this paper, so
that the lenders can only distinguish the current borrower from
other registered users with probability 1/Ng = 10−4, which is
good enough in most cases. The other essential PIR parameter
is the dimension d of a recursive PIR query. Specifically, we
can treat a dataset of Ng items as a m1×m2×·· ·×md array
and perform PIR d times recursively. In the evaluation, we
choose two settings of d: a) d = 4 and Ng = 10×10×10×10;
and b) d = 2 and Ng = 100×100. To be succinct, we denote
the two settings as Q410 and Q
2
100, respectively. Q
4
10 generates
40 ciphertexts for each query with four sub-queries, while
Q2100 generates 200 ciphertexts for each query with two sub-
queries. Taking both computation and communication cost
into account, we will show in our experiments that it is a trade-
off to choose a proper kind of recursion. We set the replace
iteration s to 1 by default (see Theorem 2).We evaluate its
impact in Section 9.5.
Sparsity of a lender’s database. A considerable factor is
the sparsity of the lenders’ databases. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 5.2, each lender only needs to store the information of
its own borrowers and performs PIR on the sparse dataset,
skipping empty items. Therefore, the sparsity strongly affects
the performance of Algorithm 1 running on each lender. The
default value in our evaluation is 0.1, a common estimate [59].
Differential privacy parameters. The privacy budget for
noise generation is another considerable factor. The goal of
noise generation in Octopus is to achieve (ε,δ)-differential
privacy after k rounds of a query. By default, we set ε= ln2≈
0.7 and δ= 10−4 as recommended in [61]. We also set k = 5,
which we think sufficient and practical in most cases, as we
present in Section 5.2.
Network configurations. As the network is usually the bot-
tleneck, we compare the following three network settings.
[WAN] To simulate the typical Internet settings, we limit the
bandwidth for all nodes to 8 Mbps (i.e. 1 MB/sec) and the
latency of each node to 50ms.
[LAN] is the raw EC2 network setting. The bandwidth among
nodes ranges from tens of Mbps to 10 Gbps. We consider this
configuration because the lenders may be a tight coupling con-
sortium (e.g. most banks in China) and have their servers in
co-located data centers, which make them enjoy LAN speed.
[EXC] As it is likely that the bandwidth of the exchanger
becomes the bottleneck, we provide a more realistic setup
where exchanger has 800 Mbps bandwidth while other nodes’
bandwidth stays 8 Mbps. The network latency stays 50ms.
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9.3 Overall Performance
We first present the overall performance of Octopus in the
800-node EC2 testbed with different network configurations.
We focus on introducing the performance in our default set-
ting presented above under different numbers of lenders and
network configurations, and we leave comparison to the other
parameters in the following sections.
[WAN] vs. [LAN] performance. We first evaluate the end-
to-end latency of a query under both network settings. Fig. 5
shows the results, and we observe the following:
1) With a small number of lenders (i.e. n < 100), the
whole process only takes several seconds (e.g. for n = 50,
WAN-Q410:22.5s, WAN-Q
2
100:10.4s, WAN-Q
4
10:15.6s, WAN-
Q2100:5.4s), showing that Octopus is practical even when the
network resource is strictly limited.
2) When the number of lenders n is small, the overall per-
formance is roughly independent of n. This is because the
bottleneck is the computation in anonymous authorization.
However, when n gets large, the network becomes the bottle-
neck, and the total time increases linearly with n.
3) The performance gap between LAN and WAN is large,
meaning that the low bandwidth of 8 Mbps significantly limits
the performance.
The above evaluation also indicates that the size of a query,
or communication cost, can be the bottleneck in WANs, espe-
cially with a large number of the lenders.
[EXC] vs. [LAN] performance. It is easy to see that the ex-
changer needs much larger bandwidth, and thus in the [EXC]
we increase the exchanger bandwidth to 800 Mbps. Fig. 6
compares the performance between [LAN] and [EXC]. We
can see that when the number of lenders increases, both the
performance gap and the performance degradation become
smaller, especially that the effect of the network nearly dis-
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role action
time (s)
Q410 Q
2
100
o generate query and proof of right form 0.083 0.306
e verify proof is well-formed 0.067 0.239
l perform PIR using Alg. 1 (sparsity = 0.1, s = 1) 1.80 0.62
e generate noise (offline, ε= 0.7,δ= 10−4,k = 5)
o decrypt each response 0.041 0.006
e generate data for authorization 2.11 1.05
o generate proof for the borrower’s identity 4.45 1.20
e verify proof for the borrower’s identity 2.28 0.118
Table 1: Computation time of each step in secure aggregation
and anonymous authorization.
apears for the Q2100 version. Meanwhile, the effect of the
network remains for the Q410 version due to the bandwidth
limits between the originator and the exchanger.
In addition to latency, we also plot the throughput in Fig. 6.
We can see that Octopus can handle 2 Q2100 queries or 0.5 Q
4
10
queries per second. This result is practical enough for loan
stacking detection. Actually, a query in existing production
systems (without security) usually crosses multiple organi-
zations (e.g. lenders), and the latency is determined by the
slowest responding node. Also as the system should handle
distribution issues such as connection fault tolerance and ac-
cess control, it is normal to take several seconds and done in
an asynchronous manner.
9.4 Cost Breakdown
Protocol 1 and 2. Table 1 summarizes the time consumed in
each step in secure aggregation and anonymous authorization,
while Table 2 shows the size of data generated and transferred
by each role. We use the initials as shorthand for a role, i.e.,
o, b, e and l stand for originator, borrower, exchanger, and
lender, respectively. From the results, we can see that, for both
computation and communication, anonymous authorization is
the main bottleneck. But the overall performance is practical,
as the whole computation only takes several seconds. We also
compare the results of the two kinds of recursions. We can
see that, in most steps, a Q2100 query outperforms a Q
4
10 query.
However, in the aspect of generating a PIR query with proof,
Q410 outperforms Q
2
100 both in terms of computation time and
data size, as expected.
Protocol 3. Table 3 shows the running time and the trans-
ferred data size of different kinds of queries in Process 3
(secure evaluation). sum and count come directly from the
secure aggregation, thus we can get them for free. For the
variance and comparison with public queries, as we employ
non-interactive ZKP, the data sent by the originator is 0 KB.
The more complex queries such as comparison with private
generator description
size (KB)
Q410 Q
2
100
o the PIR query 10.4 51.5
o the proof of the query 54.1 259
l a PIR response 3.86 0.771
e average noise responses (offline) 1191.5 250.6
e array for authorization 1370 1370
o the proof of the borrower’s identity 2061 104
Table 2: Size of data generated in secure aggregation and
anonymous authorization.
role variance cmp with public cmp with private
b 0.0018s, 0.75KB 0.009s, 2.69KB 0.143s, 1120KB
o 0.002s, 0KB 0.011s, 0KB 0.258s, 18.4KB
Table 3: Time and data size in secure evaluation.
use NISC for secure evaluation, requiring the borrower to
generate and send out multiple encrypted circuits. However, it
is still KBs in size, much smaller than the previous processes.
9.5 Parameters for Process 1 and 2
Process 1 and 2 (secure aggregation and anonymous autho-
rization) involve most computation time, and thus we would
like to further evaluate factors that affect the performance. To
better illustrate the effects of the parameters, we extend the
notation Qdni to Q
d,s
ni , where s is the replace iteration.
Sparsity. Fig. 7 shows the relation between the sparsity and
efficiency. The Q2,s100 queries perform better than the Q
4,s
10 ones.
The reason is that fewer dimensions mean fewer recursions,
leading to less computation cost. Another notable thing is
that the effect of the replace iteration s is small, especially for
small sparsities. This is because the probability of a column
being totally empty is small and there are not many 0’s to
replace, and thus the computation cost is low.
Differential privacy parameters . Differential privacy does
come with a cost, and its parameters affect the noise size. We
evaluate the average number of generated noise responses
for different values of ε and k. As Fig. 8 shows, a smaller ε
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Figure 7: The performance of Algorithm 1.
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Figure 8: The average number of noise responses.
provides stronger privacy, but leads to more noise. We also
vary the value of k and perform the same evaluation. Similarly,
larger k allows more chances of inquiring about a specific
borrower, but requires more noise to prevent accumulated
privacy leak. From the figure, we can see that the time for
generating many noise responses is non-trivial. Luckily, the
noise is independent of the queries and the commitments, so
we can pre-generate these noise responses offline, and thus
still keep the online part fast.
Replace iteration s. To choose a proper s, we first see from
Fig. 8 that if we set the replace iteration s≥ 2, the number of
noise responses grows rapidly and would bring much larger
(20×∼ 200×) communication cost than the case where s= 1.
On the other hand, Fig. 7 shows that the replace iteration s
does not affect the sparse PIR time much. Thus we set s = 1
in our evaluation.
Recursive PIR parameter. Both secure aggregation and
anonymous authorization involve PIR queries. Generally
speaking, the Q2100 version outperforms the Q
4
10 version both
in terms of computation and communication, except for the
query size. Our evaluation also shows that the choice of the re-
cursive dimension is a trade-off: more recursions means more
computation and communication between the exchanger and
the originator, while fewer recursions mean more communi-
cation between the exchanger and the lenders.
10 Discussion
More on recursive PIR parameters. The main computation
cost comes from generating PIR responses and anonymous au-
thorization. A higher-dimensional recursive PIR query means
more full-database scans, and our evaluation also shows that
Q2100 performs better than Q
4
10 in most settings. However,
fewer recursions does not always mean better performance.
Let us consider a non-recursive query, i.e. Q110000. It can be
seen that such a PIR query using the Paillier cryptosystem
with a 1024-bit key is about 2.56MB. And the proof size
would be about 12.8MB. Thus, the originator should send
more than 15MB to the exchanger, meaning that the latency
of a query would be more than 15s on a 8Mbps network. On
the other hand, as the exchanger sends the query to all the
lenders, the throughput would be less than 1/2.56≈ 0.4. Both
the latency and throughput are worse than those of Q2100.
FHE-based PIR. Systems like XPIR [9] and SealPIR [10]
employ somewhat fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). The
advantage of FHE is much lower computation cost, due to
avoiding modular exponentiation of large numbers. Unfortu-
nately, the size of a ciphertext in this scheme is much larger
than a ciphertext using Paillier, and thus we need to look for
a trade-off. The size of a d-dimensional PIR query is at least
dN1/dg l, where l is the size of a ciphertext. And the size of
the proof for the validation of a query is about 5× larger, and
thus the originator should send at least 6dN1/dg l. On the other
hand, the expansion factor of XPIR is 5, which means that
the size of each PIR response is about 5d l. With n lenders,
there are at least (6dN1/dg + n5d)l bytes of data transferred
between the originator and the exchanger. For Ng = 10000
and n = 100, we have (6dN1/dg + n5d)l ≥ 3700l. With the
default parameters in [9], the size of a ciphertext l, is about
64KB. Therefore, there is at least 3700c = 236.8MB data to
be transferred between the originator and the exchanger, not
practical in the wide-area network with many participants.
SealPIR, though avoiding large queries, still suffering from
large responses. For d = 2 recommended in [10], the size
of a query is 64KB, while the size of a response is 256KB.
Thus there are at least 6× 0.064+ n× 0.256 = 25.984MB
bytes of data to be transferred between the originator and
exchanger. Thus, we can see that FHE-based PIRs are not
practical enough in our setting.
11 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose Octopus, the first practical distributed system
for privacy-preserving loan stacking detection. The process
of Octopus includes three processes which can run in paral-
lel: secure aggregation, anonymous authorization, and secure
evaluation. For secure aggregation, we propose a method
to retrieve the commitments with differential privacy, and
use zero-knowledge proofs to authorize the anonymous bor-
rower’s identity. For secure evaluation, we support multiple
kinds of efficient queries, including linear and non-linear ones.
We then evaluate Octopus and show the trade-offs for select-
ing parameters. The evaluation demonstrates that Octopus
can handle queries within a second in a real-world setting,
and is practical for privacy-preserving credit evaluation.
As future work, we will add more features to Octopus. For
example, we can use ring signature [65] to enable the orig-
inator to anonymously send an authorized query. Also, we
can borrow the idea of [55] to enable anonymous payment for
each query. Moreover, we can use distributed synchronization
systems like [36] for maintaining global configurations and
status. Last but not least, we will add fault tolerance mech-
anisms to make Octopus more robust. We believe that with
these improvements, our design would be more deployable in
real-world scenarios.
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n the number of lenders
Si the i-th lender where 0≤ i < n
x
the total amount of money the current borrower
has borrowed
xi
the amount of money the current borrower has
borrowed from Si
xiu
the amount of money the borrower with identity
u has borrowed from Si
τiu
the secret string of the borrower with identity u
shared with Si
τeu
the secret string of the borrower with identity u
shared with the exchanger
d the dimension of a recursive PIR query
dˆ the number of noise types of 0 string ciphertexts
s
the replace iteration, after which
we replace all empty items with E(0)’s
pko
sko
the public-private key pair of the originator
E(·) the public-key encryption scheme
Ed(·) applying the same public-key encryption schemefor d times
0l a 0 string which has the same length with El(0)
Qdm a d-dimensional query for m
d items
Qd,sm
a d-dimensional query for md items
with replace iteration s
p,q
g,h
the parameters of the commitment function
F(x,r) the commitment to x with randomness r
N the number of registered users on the exchanger
Ng the number of registered users in each group
gidu the group id of the user u
pidu the position in the group of the user u
ε,δ the parameters of differential privacy
µ,λ the parameters of Laplace distribution
Table 4: The notations in this paper.
A Notations
Table 4 summarizes the notations used in this paper. Readers
can refer to this table for convenience.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Given the non-negative integer vector ~v = (n0,n1, . . . ,nd)
where ni is the number of responses of type i, assume that
a change of a lender’s database results in a new vector
~v′ = (n′0,n
′
1, . . . ,n
′
d). As each lender only sends one response
to the exchanger, any change to a lender’s database would only
change the type of one response. i.e., ∃i, j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,d}, i 6=
j, s.t. 
ni−n′i = 1
n j−n′j =−1
∀k 6= i, j nk = n′k
Now we fix the above i and j, and consider a non-
negative integer vector set N′′ = {(n′′0 ,n′′1 , . . . ,n′′d)
∣∣ n′′i >
max(ni,n′i),n′′j > max(n j,n′j)}. And we denote {N′′ as the
complementary set of N′′.
As the sensitivity of ~v is 2, i.e., the L1-norm ‖~v−~v′‖1 ≤
2, adding a noise vector ~˜v = (n˜0, n˜1, . . . , n˜d) achieves ε-
differential privacy, where n˜i ∼ Lap(µ,λ) and ε= 2λ , i.e., for
any set S⊂ N′′, we have Pr[~v+~˜v ∈ S]≤ eε ·Pr[~v′+~˜v ∈ S].
Meanwhile, we calculate the probability that the perturbed
vector is not in N′′ as follows:
Pr[~v+~˜v 6∈ N′′]
= Pr[ni+ n˜i ≤max(ni,n′i) or n j + n˜ j ≤max(n j,n′j)]
= 1−
(1−Pr[ni+ n˜i ≤max(ni,n′i)])(1−Pr[n j + n˜ j ≤max(n j,n′j)])
≤ 1− (1−Pr[ni+ n˜i ≤ ni+1])(1−Pr[n j + n˜ j ≤ n j +1])
= 1− (1−Pr[n˜i ≤ 1])(1−Pr[n˜ j ≤ 1])
= 1− (1−Pr[Lap(µ,λ)≤ 1])(1−Pr[Lap(µ,λ)≤ 1])
= 1− (1− 1
2
e
1−µ
λ )2
= e
1−µ
λ (1− 1
4
e
1−µ
λ ) = δ
Therefore, for any non-negative integer vector set S, we
have
Pr[~v+~˜v ∈ S]
= Pr[~v+~˜v ∈ S∩N′′]+Pr[~v+~˜v ∈ S∩{N′′]
≤ Pr[~v+~˜v ∈ N′′]+Pr[~v+~˜v ∈ S∩{N′′]
≤ Pr[~v+~˜v ∈ N′′]+Pr[~v+~˜v 6∈ N′′]
≤ eεPr[~v′+~˜v ∈ S]+δ
C Proof of Theorem 2
To see how many borrowers would be affected by a specific
borrower b, we first arrange the dataset consisting of m ele-
ments as a m1×m2×·· ·×md array: A = {ak1k2...kd ;1≤ki≤mi}.
Now we consider two borrowers b = ak1k2...kd and b
′ =
ak′1k′2...k′d .
We first assume that after the (s − 1)-th iteration of
a PIR query, we get mˆs−1 = m/∏s−1i=1 mi ciphertexts, say
Cs−1 = {cs−1ksks+1...kd ;1 ≤ ki ≤ mi}, and some of them may
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be 0’s, i.e. empty items. Then we perform the s-th iter-
ation using the subquery qs1,qs2, . . . ,qsms and get C
s =
{csks+1ks+2...kd ;1 ≤ ki ≤ mi} consisting of mˆs = mˆs−1/ms ele-
ments, where csks+1ks+2...kd =∏1≤ j≤ks,csjks+1 ...kd 6=0
(cs−1jks+1...kd )
qs j .
This indicates that the sequence of ciphertexts involving
ak1k2...kd is S= (c
1
k1k2...kd
,c2k2...kd , . . . ,c
d−1
kd
,cd), where cd is the
final PIR response exposed to the receiver. It can be seen that
cs−1ksks+1...kd is only involved in c
s
ks+1ks+2...kd
, that is, a ciphertext
in Cs−1 is only involved in one ciphertext in Cs. We can then
use mathematical induction to prove that an element in A
can only be involved in one ciphertext in the s-th iteration
ciphertexts Cs.
Now we consider the situation where the query is for
b = ak1k2...kd , and we want to know how b
′ = ak′1k′2...k′d af-
fects the query response. The ciphertext sequences involv-
ing b and b′ are S = (c1k2k3...kd ,c
2
k3...kd
, . . . ,cd−1kd ,c
d) and S′ =
(c1k′2k′3...k′d
,c2k′3...k′d
, . . . ,cd−1k′d
,cd), repectively .
We first find a minimum i such that ki+1 = k′i+1,ki+2 =
k′i+2, . . . ,kd = k
′
d . If such i exists, we have c
i−1
kiki+1...kd
6=
ci−1k′ik′i+1...k′d
and ciki+1ki+2...kd = c
i
k′i+1k′i+2...k′d
. According to the
above analysis, how b′ affects cd is equivalent to how
ci−1k′ik′i+1...k′d
affects ciki+1ki+2...kd . As the query is for b, the query
ciphertext for ci−1k′ik′i+1...k′d
is E(0), while the query ciphertext
for ci−1kiki+1...kd is E(1). Then there are three cases:
1) ci−1kiki+1...kd 6= 0, i.e. c
i−1
kiki+1...kd
is not empty: in this case, we
always have ciki+1ki+2...kd = E(c
i−1
kiki+1...kd
). Thus ci−1k′ik′i+1...k′d
has no effect on ciki+1ki+2...kd .
2) ci−1kiki+1...kd is empty but there exists a non-empty item in
the set Cs \{ci−1kiki+1...kd ,c
i−1
k′ik′i+1...k′d
}: In this case, we always
have ciki+1ki+2...kd = E(0), thus c
i−1
k′ik′i+1...k′d
has no effect on
ciki+1ki+2...kd .
3) ci−1kiki+1...kd as well as all the elements in the set C
s \
{ci−1kiki+1...kd ,c
i−1
k′ik′i+1...k′d
} are empty: In this case, if ci−1k′ik′i+1...k′d
is empty, ciki+1ki+2...kd = 0, otherwise c
i
ki+1ki+2...kd
= E(0).
This means ci−1k′ik′i+1...k′d
has an effect on ciki+1ki+2...kd in this
case.
But if there is no such i that ki+1 = k′i+1,ki+2 =
k′i+2, . . . ,kd = k
′
d , the only way b
′ can affect the value of cd is
to make cd−1k′d
affect cd . However, as we always replace empty
result 0 with E(0d−1), b′ cannot affect the value of cd .
In conclusion, b affects cd if and only if there is a such i
and at the same time the absence of ci−1k′ik′i+1...k′d
would make
ciki+1ki+2...kd = 0 empty. It is easy to see that the existence of
such i is equivalent to kd = k′d . For a specific borrower b =
ak1k2...kd , the number of borrowers meeting this requirement
is ∏d−1i=1 mi. So we conclude a) in Theorem 2.
On the other hand, replacing the empty items with Ed−s(0s)
after the s-th iteration, the absence of cs−1k′sk′s+1...k′d
would have
no effect on csks+1ks+2...kd and its successors any more, as case
3) above would not appear after the s-th iteration. In this
situation, to affect cd , b′ should affect at least one of the ele-
ments in (c1k2k3...kd ,c
2
k3...kd
, . . . ,cs−1ksks+1...kd ), which is equivalent
to ks = k′s,ks+1 = k′s+1, . . . ,kd = k
′
d . For a specific borrower
b = ak1k2...kd , the number of borrowers meeting the require-
ment is ∏s−1i=1 mi. Meanwhile, as all the empty items are re-
placed after the s-th iteration, there would be no empty items
since then. In other words, th final output cd would not be of
type s+1, type s+2, . . . , type d. Thus we have dˆ = s. So we
conclude b) in Theorem 2.
D Secure Aggregation Protocol
Protocol 1 summarizes our secure aggregation protocol. The
correctness of the consistency check in this protocol is directly
from [27]. Also, introducing the noise from the exchanger
does not hurt the privacy, as we can treat the exchanger as
another lender which generates responses containing commit-
ments to 0. That is, as long as the originator correctly retrieves
the commitments from the lenders, the borrower is unable to
cheat the originator about her loan amount. Meanwhile, the
randomness added to each ciphertext in Algorithm 1 and the
noise responses generated by the exchanger prevent the orig-
inator from inferring extra information about each lender’s
data from the responses.
E ZKP for a Valid Query
Algorithm 2 shows the zero-knowledge proof of a valid
query. The goal is that, for the subquery qi1,qi2, . . . ,qimi of
each dimension i, we prove that there is only one 1 in the
subquery and the others are 0’s. We first prove that each qi j
encrypts 0 or 1 using partial ZKP, then prove that the sum of
the subquery is 1, i.e., ∏ j qi j encrypts 1. This indicates that
there is only one 1 in each subquery.
PROOF SKETCH: Our zero-knowledge proof of a valid query
is based on common ZKP techniques (i.e. partial ZKP and
ZKP for Paillier cryptosystem), thus the completeness and
zero-knowledgeness of our proof comes directly from these
techniques.
And we show the soundness as follows. First we can see
that each qi j encrypts 0 or 1, which is proved using partial
ZKP. We then assume that the subquery of each dimension
i, qi1,qi2, . . . ,qimi , contains ki 1’s and mi− ki 0’s. Thus for a
valid query q, we have ki = 1 for every i. In other words, if the
query q is invalid, there should exist a dimension i such that
ki 6= 1. However, for each dimension i, qi =∏m jj=1 qi j encrypts
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PROTOCOL 1: Secure aggregation using DSPIR, Πagg
a) To retrieve the loan information of a borrower b, the
originator generates a d-dimentional recursive query and
sends it along with gidb to the lenders through the
exchanger.
b) For each registered user u who is in the group gidb and
has borrowed money xiu from the lender Si, Si calculates
riu = PRFτiu(“rc”‖u‖xiu‖date) and generates the
commitment to xiu as ciu = F(xiu,riu). Then it arranges
the commitments in an array A according their pid’s, and
performs the computation in Algorithm 1.
c) Each lender sends its result to the exchanger: if
Algorithm 1 returns a ciphertext, it sends the ciphertext to
the exchanger; otherwise, if Algorithm 1 returns 0, it
sends Ed(0) to the exchanger.
d) For each i = 1,2, . . . ,d, the exchanger generates n˜i noise
responses of type i, where n˜i ∼ dmax(0,Lap(µ,λ))e.
Meanwhile, the exchanger samples a random integer
n0 ∼ dmax(0,Lap(µ,λ))e, and genereates n0
commitments F(0,r1),F(0,r2), . . . ,F(0,rn0). Then the
exchanger calculates rz = ∑
n0
j=0 r j, and encrypts the
commitments to get n0 responses of type 0. Finally, the
exchanger mixes these responses with the responses
collected from the lenders.
e) The borrower calculates ro = PRFτob(“rc”‖b‖date). For
each Si, the borrower b calcluates
ri = PRFτib(“rc”‖b‖xib‖date). Also, the borrower
generates a commitment to the total money she has
borrowed: cb = F(∑xib,rb). Then the borrower sends
∆rb = rb− ro−∑ri to the exchanger and sends cb to the
originator through the exchanger.
f) The exchanger shuffles the responses and sends the
responses to the originator. Also, the exchanger calculates
∆r = ∆rb− rz, then sends ∆r to the originator.
g) The originator initializes an empty set C and decrypts the
responses. If a response is of type 0, the originator adds
the commitment contained in the response to C. Then the
originator calculates c =∏ci∈C ci. Finally, the originator
checks if cb = c ·h∆r+ro , where
ro = PRFτob(“rc”‖b‖date).
Algorithm 2: Zero-knowledge proof of a valid query,
ΠZKPoQ.
Initialize:
The prover and the verifier share a recursive PIR query
q = {{q11,q12, . . . ,q1m1},{q21,q22, . . . ,q2m2}, . . . ,
{qd1,qd2, . . . ,qdmd}}.
Prover:
a) For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,d}, calculate qi =∏m jj=1 qi j.
b) For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,d} and each j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,mi},
generate non-interactive partial ZKP pi j which proves
that qi j contains either 0 or 1, and non-interactive ZKP
pi which proves that qi contains 1.
c) Send
p = {{p11, p12, . . . , p1m1 , p1},{p21, p22, . . . , p2m2 , p2},
. . . ,{pd1, pd2, . . . , pdmd , pd}} as the proof to the verifier.
Verifier:
a) For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,d} and each j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,mi},
use pi j to verify that qi j indeed contains 0 or 1.
b) For each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,d}, calculate qi =∏m jj=1 qi j,
and use pi to verify that qi indeed contains 1.
c) Return true if the above verifications pass.
the sum of the number encrypted in qi j, and ∏
m j
j=1 qi j actually
encrypts ki in our situation. Thus if ki 6= 1, the prover cannot
prove that qi encrypts 1. This means that only when all the
subqueries are valid an the prover prove that qi’s encrypt 1.
F ZKP of the Correspondence of a Secret and
a Recursive PIR Query
The prover sends a d-dimensional recursive PIR query q and a
ciphertext c to the verifier. Then the verifier performs PIR on
an array A consisting of m items using the query q and finally
get Ed(a), where a is an item of A. The goal of the prover in
this protocol is to prove that the number a encrypted in Ed(a)
is also encrypted in c. Algorithm 3 shows this process. We
denote K as the index set {(k1,k2, . . . ,kd)} where 1 ≤ ki ≤
mi. And for each i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,d}, we denote K∗i as the set
{(k1, . . . ,ki−1,ki+1, . . . ,kd)}. Obliviously, |K|=m and |K∗i |=
m/mi. Also, for a k∗ = (k1, . . . ,ki−1,ki+1, . . . ,kd) ∈ K∗i , we
denote akik∗ = ak1...ki−1kiki+1...kd , an element of A with index
(k1, . . . ,ki−1,ki,ki+1, . . . ,kd).
We need a protocol to prove that one of the given several
ciphertexts c1,c2, . . . ,cm encrypts the same number as
another ciphertext c, i.e., ∃i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}, the plaintext of
ci is the same as the plaintext of c. This can be done using
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existing techniques. We first consider a simple situation
where m = 1 and the prover needs to prove that c1 encrypts
the same number as c. Given c1 = gxrn1 and c = g
xrn, the
prover can prove that c1 encrypts the same number as c by
showing that she knows a number r′ which is a n-th modulo
root of c1c−1 (equivalent to (r1r−1)n) using the techniques
in [6, 27]. It can be seen that, to accomplish this proof, the
prover only needs to know r1r−1, and does not need to
know c1,c or x. Combining this proof and the partial ZKP
technique [28], we can get the target proof.
Algorithm 3: Zero-knowledge proof of the correspon-
dence of a secret and a recursive PIR query, ΠZKPoCR
Initialize:
The prover and the verifier share a valid recursive PIR
query q = {{q11,q12, . . . ,q1m1},{q21,q22, . . . ,q2m2}, . . . ,
{qd1,qd2, . . . ,qdmd}}, an array A with m different items,
and a ciphertext c which is the ciphertext of one of the
items of A. The prover knows the plaintext xi j and the
randomness ri j of each qi j (i.e. qi j = gxi j rni j), as well as
the randomness r of c, while the verifier does not know
these information.
Prover:
a) Arrange A as a m1×m2×·· ·×md array: A = {ak1k2...kd}
where 1≤ ki ≤ mi for each dimension i.
b) Generate a list of random numbers {{r11,r12, . . . ,r1m1},
{r21,r22, . . . ,r2m2}, . . . ,{rd1,rd2, . . . ,rdmd}}.
For each dimension i(1≤ i≤ d) and each
k∗i j ∈ K∗i (1≤ j ≤ |K∗i |), calculate r∗i j =∏miki=1(riki)
akik∗i j .
c) For each dimension i, using r∗i1,r
∗
i2, . . . ,r
∗
i|K∗i | and r, generate
the proof which proves that one of c∗i1,c
∗
i2, . . . ,c
∗
i|K∗i |
encrypts the same number as c.
Send the proof to the verifier.
Verifier:
a) Arrange A as a m1×m2×·· ·×md array: A = {ak1k2...kd}.
b) For each dimension i(1≤ i≤ d), use the subquery
{qi1,qi2, . . . ,qimi} to perform information retrieval along
that dimension, which outputs m/mi ciphertexts: for each
k∗i j ∈ K∗i , calculate c∗i j =∏miki=1(qiki)
akik∗i j , equivalent to
∏miki=1(g
xiki rniki)
akik∗i j = g∑
mi
ki=1
xiki akik∗ r∗i j
n.
c) For each dimension i, using the proof from the prover,
verify that one of c∗i1,c
∗
i2, . . . ,c
∗
i|K∗i | encrypts the same
number as c.
PROOF SKETCH: The zero-knowledgeness of this proof
comes directly from the partial ZKP technique. As for the
completeness, as the query is valid, let we assume that, for
each dimension i, we have qik′i = E(1), i.e., xik′i = 1. Thus,
c∗i j = g
∑
mi
ki=1
xiki akik∗ r∗i j
n = g
ak′ik∗ r∗i j
n =E(ak′ik∗). That is, for each
dimension i, c∗i1,c
∗
i2, . . . ,c
∗
i|K∗i | are the ciphertexts of all the
items with ki = k′i. And if c really encrypts the number cor-
responding to the query, we have c = E(ak′1k′2...k′d ). Thus the
number encrypted in c must in the set {c∗i1,c∗i2, . . . ,c∗i|K∗i |}, i.e.,
c encrypts the same number as one of c∗i1,c
∗
i2, . . . ,c
∗
i|K∗i |.
We then show the soundness as follows. Let we assume that
the number c encrypts is ak′′1 k′′2 ...k′′d . Now if there is a dimension
i such that k′′i 6= k′i, then the proof that one of c∗i1,c∗i2, . . . ,c∗i|K∗i |
encrypts the same number as c would fail, as c∗i1,c
∗
i2, . . . ,c
∗
i|K∗i |
are the ciphertexts of the items with ki = k′i and the items in
A are of different values. Thus, if all the proofs pass, we have
k′′i = k′i for every dimension i, which indicates that ak′′1 k′′2 ...k′′d =
ak′1k′2...k′d , i.e., the number encrypted in c corresponds to the
query.
G Anonymous Authorization Protocol
Protocol 2 shows the overall protocol for anonymous autho-
rization. The borrower and the originator use a PRF to gen-
erate randomness for Paillier encryption. The PRF takes τob
shared between the borrower and the originator as seed. Note
that instead of using τeu’s directly as the secrets to be re-
trieved, the exchanger generates a new random number re in
each round and uses another PRF to output random numbers
yu’s as the secrets to be retrieved in this round. As the PRF
takes τeu’s as seeds, each registered user u shares a distinct yu
with the exchanger. The reason why we do not use τeu’s di-
rectly is that the ZKP protocol for correspondence mentioned
above requires the verifier (i.e. the exchanger) to send the se-
crets to the prover (i.e. originator). Thus, we should use newly
generated random numbers as the secrets to be retrieved by
the PIR query in each round to avoid the leakage of τeu’s.
H Security Analysis and Proof of Octopus
For security assumption, we assume that the exchanger and
lenders are semi-honest, while assuming that the borrower
and originator are malicious, as what is stated in Section 3.4.
In the following proofs, we denote this assumption about par-
ticipants by POctopus. In addition, we use ex, og, bo and le
as the abbreviations of exchanger, originator, borrower and
lender, respectively. For each protocol, we prove three proper-
ties: 1) correctness: the protocol gives expected outputs and
detects malicious behaviors; 2) privacy: the output reveals no
unexpected information; 3) security: during the execution of
the protocol, an participant gets no information other than the
output. Specifically, we define the security of the protocols in
this paper as follows:
19
PROTOCOL 2: Anonymous borrower authorization, Πauth
a) The exchanger generates a random number re and sends re
to the borrower.
b) Unpon receiving re, the borrower b calculates
y = PRFτeb(“y”‖re‖date). With the Paillier public key
pko = (n,g) of the originator , the borrower encrypts y as
c = gyrn, where r = PRFτob(“r”‖pko‖b‖date). Then the
borrower sends c and the zero-knowledge proof Pk which
proves to the exchanger that she knows the plaintext (i.e.
y) in c.
c) For each user u in the group gidb, the exchanger calculates
yu = PRFτeu(“y”‖re‖date) and sends yu’s to the originator.
d) The originator generates the PIR query q and sends the
query and the zero-knowledge proof Pq which proves that
the query is valid to the exchanger.
e) The originator calculates r = PRFτob(“r”‖pk‖b‖date).
With q, r and yu’s, the originator generates the
zero-knowledge proof Pcr, which proves that for each
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,d}, the ciphertext c encrypts the same
number as one of ciphertexts produced by the subquery of
dimension i. Then the originator sends the proof to the
exchanger.
f) Finally, with the proofs from the borrower and the
originator, the exchanger verifies three things: 1) The
borrower really knows the plaintext encrypted in c; 2) The
query from the originator is valid; 3) For each
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,d}, the ciphertext c encrypts the same
number as one of ciphertexts produced by the subquery of
dimension i.
Definition 1. A protocol pi securely realizes a function f in
the presence of POctopus, if for every probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary i ∈ {ex,og,bo, le}, there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time simulator S such that for every possible input
tuple~x, we have:
S(xi, fi(~x))≈ Viewpii (~x)
where fi(~x) is the output for i of f .
We prove the security with the hybrid model by showing
that our protocols satisfy Definition 1. We first prove that
Protocol 2 Πauth is secure. Then we prove the security of
Protocol 1 Πagg when composed with Πauth. Finally, we show
that the security of our protocol satisfies the security require-
ments in Section 3.3.
H.1 Security Proof of Anonymous Authoriza-
tion
We prove the security ofΠauth in this section. We define Fauth
as the functionality of Πauth as follows. The output indicates
whether the query the originator sends is authorized.
Functionality Fauth
Inputs: The borrower inputs the secret τeb. The origina-
tor inputs a d-dimensional plaintext query q and the group
id gidb of the borrower. The exchanger inputs a set of the
secrets TE = {τeu} shared between the exchanger and the
users/borrowers.
Process:
1. Check that q is valid. If the check fails, set z =⊥, output
z to the exchanger and abort.
2. Retrieve τ from TE according to gidb and q.
3. Check that the retrieved value τ equals τeb. If the check
succeeds, set z = “pass”, otherwise set z =⊥.
4. Output z to the exchanger.
Theorem 3. Πauth securely realizes Fauth in the presence of
POctopus.
PROOF SKETCH: Correctness. The joint input of the orig-
inator and the borrower in Πauth includes a ciphertext c, a
PIR query q and proofs Pk, Pq and Pcr (we sometimes omit
gidb as it does not affect the correctness of our analysis). The
exchanger verifies the three proofs in step f of Πauth. Specifi-
cally, the exchanger uses c and Pk to verify proof 1, uses q and
Pq to verify proof 2, and uses c, q and Pcr to verify proof 3.
With the ZKP protocols describted in the above sections, hon-
est inputs enable the verifications to pass, while any dishonest
value in the set {c,q,Pk,Pq,Pcr} causes verification failure.
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Specifically, proof 2 ensures a valid query, while proof 1 and 3
ensure that the borrower knows the plaintext in the ciphertext
retrieved using the query, thus eradicate a malicious originator
and borrower who does not know τeb.
Privacy. The output is an indicator indicating that the query is
authorized by a real borrowr or not. The indicator itself reveals
no sensitive information about the participants’ private input.
Security. We first prove the security against a malicious
originator and a malicious borrower. For an adversary Ao
that corrupts the originator, the view of Ao in Πauth is a set
of pseudo-random numbers Y = {yu}. We then construct a
simulator So that produces a set of random numbers Y ′= {y′u}.
As each pseudo-random number yu ∈ Y in Πauth is generated
using a seed that is not known by the originator, when the
pseudo-random function PRF we use is secure, Ao can only
distinguish Y and Y ′ with negligible probability.
For an adversary Ab that corrupts the borrower, the view
of Ab in Πauth is a random number re. We can construct a
simulator Sb that produces a random number r′e. The indistin-
guishability is direct.
However, if an adversary Aob corrupts both the originator
and the borrower, the joint view of Aob includes Y and re. We
then construct a probabilistic-polynomial time simulator Sob
which works as follows:
1. Generate a pesudo-number y′b = PRFτeb(“y”‖re‖date).
For every other user u in group gidb, generate a random
number yu. Compose these numbers into a set Y ′.
2. Generate a random number r′e.
3. Send Y ′ and r′e to the adversary Aob.
Now we show (Y,re) ≈ (Y ′,r′e). With the knowledge of τeb,
Aob can generate yb such that yb = y′b. The other pseudo-
random numbers in Y , however, are generated using seeds not
known by Aob, and thus are computationally indisinguishable
with the truely-random numbers in Y ′ for Aob. Meanwhile,
both re and r′e are truely-random numbers, and thus are in-
disinguishable. This indicates the indistinguishability.
For the exchanger, the view is a tuple (c,q,Pk,Pq,Pcr). We
construct a probabilistic-polynomial time simulator Se that
receives gidb, TE and z from the exchanger. And we consider
two cases: a) z is ⊥; b) z is “pass”.
Case a indicates that the borrower b intends to pretend
another borrower b′. In this situation, the borrower and the
originator do not have the private information of b′ (i.e. the
secret τeb′ shared between b′ and the exchanger) and the se-
curity analysis for this case is trival: Se just needs to behave
as the same as the borrower b and originator. We omit the
details.
For case b, both the borrower and originator behave hon-
estly. Se works as follows:
1. For each user u in group gidb, generate a pesudo-number
y′u = PRFτeb(“y”‖re‖date), and denote Y ′ = {y′u}. Ran-
domly choose a position u′ in that group and select a
corresponding number y′ in Y ′.
2. Encrypt y′ as c′ = gy′r′n, where (n,g) is a random public
key of Paillier crypto system and r′ is a random number
sampled from Zn. Then generate a proof P′k that proves
the knowledge of the plaintext encrypted in c′. Output c′
and P′k to the exchanger.
3. Generate a d-dimensional PIR query q′ according to u′.
Generate a proof P′q that proves q′ is a valid query. Output
q′ and P′q to the exchanger.
4. Use q′, r′ and Y ′ to generate a proof P′cr that proves the
correspondence. Output P′cr to the exchanger.
We need to prove that (c,q,Pk,Pq,Pcr) ≈ (c′,q′,P′k,P′q,P′cr).
We can treat (c,Pk) as the output of a randomized function f
which takes y as input, i.e. (c,Pk) = f (y) and (c′,P′k) = f (y
′).
We first see that c ≈ c′ due to the security of the Paillier
crypto system. If an adversary can distinguish between (c,Pk)
and (c′,P′k) with advantage ε, he can distinguish which in-
put (y or y′) f takes with advantage ε. However, according
to the zero knowledge property of ΠZKPoK , ε should be neg-
ligible. The same applies to proving (q,Pq) ≈ (q′,P′q) and
(c,q,Pcr) ≈ (c′,q′,P′cr). It remains to show that composing
these proofs retains indistinguishability. Actually, each private
number behind each proof is masked by a random number,
and the random number is hiden using a one-way function
that cannot be opened by the verifier (please see [27] for
details). As in our protocol these random numbers are gen-
erated independently, the three proofs are independent ran-
dom tuples for the exchanger, thus each proof would not hurt
the zero knowledge property of the others. Finally, we have
(c,q,Pk,Pq,Pcr)≈ (c′,q′,P′k,P′q,P′cr).
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H.2 Security Proof of Secure Aggregation
Functionality Fagg
Initialization: Upon invocation, Fagg gets the random tape
Re of the exchanger and the common input Ng.
Inputs: The borrower inputs a random number rb and a com-
mitment cb. The originator inputs a d-dimensional plaintext
query q and the group id of the borrower gidb. Each lender
Si inputs its database Di.
Process:
1. Initialize a type count vector~v = {n0,n1, . . . ,nd} where
for each 0≤ j ≤ d we have n j = 0. For each Di, deduce
the type of ciphertext by simulating the PIR process using
the plaintext query and datasets. If the type is type j,
increase n j by 1.
2. Generate a noise vector (nˆ0, nˆ1, . . . , nˆd) according to The-
orem 1 to achieve differential privacy. The randomness
of the noise is sampled from the random tape Re of the
exchanger. For each j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,d}, increase n j by nˆ j.
3. Use rb to open cb and get xb.
4. For each Di, retrieve x′ib using gidb and q, then check if
cb = F(xb,rb) and xb = ∑i x′ib. Denote the check result
by z (“pass” or ⊥).
5. Output~v and z to the originator.
We define Fagg as the functionality of secure aggregation
as above. As we stated in Section 6, Πagg works under the
assumption of a semi-honest originator, and the purpose of
Πauth is to detect a malicious originator that sends unautho-
rized queries. As we can have Πagg and Πauth share the same
PIR query q (this can be guaranteed as the exchanger receives
the PIR query in both protocols), we can use Πauth to enhance
the security of Πagg. We define such a protocol as Πauagg,
which is depicted in Protocol 3. Πauagg enables the secure ag-
gregation to work under the assumption of POctopus. InΠauagg,
if the originator’s query is authorized, the originator gets the
output of Πagg and checks the consistency of the commitment
from the borrower and the information from the lenders. On
the other hand, when getting a symbol ⊥ from Fauth, the ex-
changer discards the messages and aborts the protocol, and
in this case the originator would get no message except a ⊥
from the exchanger.
Theorem 4. Πauagg securely realizes Fagg in the Fauth-hybrid
model in the presence of POctopus.
PROOF SKETCH: Correctness. If the participants behave
honestly, the check of Πagg passes due to the bindness of
the commitment scheme. This is because in Πagg both cb
PROTOCOL 3: Authorization-enhanced aggregation, Πauagg
a) All the participants execute the steps a to e of Πagg.
b) Concurrently, the borrower, the originator and the
exchanger call Fauth. The query q the originator inputs to
Πagg is the same as the query used in Fauth. The
exchanger gets an indicator z which indicates the query is
authorized or not.
c) If z is “pass”, the participants execute the remaining steps
of Πagg and the originator gets the output of Πagg.
Otherwise, the exchanger aborts the execution and the
originator gets a symbol ⊥.
and c commit to ∑i xib, with rb and rz +∑i ri as the random-
ness, respectively. As ∆r + ro = rb −∑i ri − rz, the check
cb = c · h∆r+ro indicates the consistency. The originator’s
input includes a query q and a group id gidb, and Fauth en-
sures that an adversary Ao that corrupts the originator and
gives incorrect input to the input tape of the originator would
be detected. Now we analyze the situation where the bor-
rower is corrupted by an adversary Ab and gives dishonest
inputs. As the messages the borrower sends in Πagg include
a commitment cb and a random number ∆rb, Ab should con-
struct a message pair (c′b,∆r
′
b) satisfing c
′
b = c · h∆r
′
b−rz+ro ,
which indicates c′b = F(∑i xib,∑i ri) · h∆r
′
b+ro , equivalent to
c′b = F(∑i xib,∑i ri) · F(0,∆r′b + ro). Due to the homomor-
phism property of the commitment scheme, we can see that c′b
is another commitment to∑i xib in this case. On the other hand,
as each ri is generated using a random seed τib, F(∑i xib,∑i ri)
is masked by pseudo-random numbers and a malicious bor-
rower using incorrect seeds can only construct a same commit-
ment with negligible probability. Therefore, we can conclude
that a corrupted borrower using dishonest inputs can only pass
the check of the originator in Πagg with negligible probability.
So we get the correctness.
Privacy. For privacy, the exchanger gets an indicator which
indicates that the inputs of the originator and borrower are
valid or not. The originator gets an indicator which indicates
that the borrower’s input is consistent with the lenders’ in-
puts or not. In addition, the originator gets a vector~v which
contains the lenders’ response types with noise. The two indi-
cators are necessary for our security goals and do not contain
sensitive information. The type count vector~v does not reveal
the concret values of the borrower’s inputs, and protects the
types of the lenders’ databases with differential privacy.
Security. We first consider the semi-honest lenders. The
lenders input their databases and seeds, and get no output
in Πauagg. The view of each lender Si is a d-dimensional
PIR query q. We can construct a simulator Si that randomly
pick a position in the lender’s database and generates a valid
d-dimensional PIR query q′ encrypted using a random key.
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Given the security of the Paillier crypto system, we have that
q and q′ are computationally indistinguishable.
The view of the exchanger in Πauagg includes a PIR query
q from the originator, a commitment cb and a random number
∆rb from the borrower, and a set of PIR responses C from
the lenders. We construct a simulator Se that first generates a
random commitment c′b, then uses the originator’s public key
(n,g) to generate a PIR query q′, samples a random number
∆r′b from the field of the committed values, and generates a set
of random PIR responses of type 0 (denoted by C′). Finally,
Se sends the messages it generates to the exchanger. We first
see that both cb and c′b are commitments with independent
randomness, and ∆rb is masked by pseudo-random numbers
generated using a seed unknown by the exchanger, thus is
indistinguishable with ∆r′b for the exchanger. Further more, as
∆rb is masked by ro, the distribution of ∆rb is independent of
the distribution of cb. Thus we have (cb,∆rb)≈ (c′b,∆r′b). On
the other hand, both q and q′ consist of Paillier ciphertexts and
are indistinguishable for the exchanger. Meanwhile, the PIR
responses in C, though generated using q, are randomized
by the lenders (see Algorithm 1 for details), thus are also
indistinguishable with the ciphertexts in C′ for the exchanger.
Finally, we have (cb,∆rb,q,C)≈ (c′b,∆r′b,q′,C′).
For the originator, we assume that it is corrupted by an
adversary Ao. If Ao gives incorrect inputs to the originator,
Fauth detects it (step 2 inΠauagg) and the exchanger outputs⊥
to the originator and aborts the execution. In this case Ao only
gets a symbol ⊥ as output and the view is empty. But if Ao
gives correct inputs to the originator and still gets ⊥ from the
exchanger, Ao knows that the borrower lies about her identity,
and the view is also empty in this case. We then consider the
case where Ao gives correct inputs and the exchanger sends
the messages from the borrower and the PIR responses to the
orignator. In this case, the view of Ao includes a commitment
cb, a random number ∆r and a set of PIR responses C that con-
tains the responses from the lenders and the noise responses
from the exchanger. After decrypting the ciphertexts in C, Ao
gets the type count vector~v = {n0,n1, . . . ,nd} and checks the
consistency, the result of which is denoted as z.~v and z are the
originator’s output. We construct a probabilistic-polynomial
time simulator So which works as follows:
1. Receive τob, the public key (n,g),~v and z from Ao.
2. Sample a random number r′b from the field of the com-
mited values, and generate a commitment c′b = F(0,r
′
b).
3. Generate fake PIR responses according to~v. Specifically,
for 1≤ j ≤ d, generate n j fake responses of type j, and
for j = 0, generate n0 responses as follows:
a) Sample n0 random numbers r1,r2, . . . ,rn0 from the
field of the commited values, and calculate r′z =
∑n0i=1 rn0 .
b) Generate n0 commitments that commit to 0 using
the random numbers sampled in the previous step.
c) Encrypt the commitments as n0 responses of type 0.
Shuffle these fake PIR responses. Denote the set of the
responses as C′.
4. If z is “pass”, calculate r′o = PRFτob(“rc”‖b‖date) and set
∆r′ = r′b− r′z− r′o; otherwise, sample a random number r′
from the field of the commited values and set ∆r′ = r′.
5. Send c′b, ∆r
′ and C′ to Ao.
Our goal is to prove that (cb,∆r,C) ≈ (c′b,∆r′,C′). We first
have ∆r ≈ ∆r′, as ∆r′ is a random number generated by
So, while ∆r is masked by a random number generated by
the borrower. On the other hand, Ao gets two things from
C (resp. C′): a type count vector ~v (resp. ~v′) and a list of
commitments c1,c2, . . . ,cn0 (resp. c
′
1,c
′
2, . . . ,c
′
n0). We can
see that the consistency check result in the simulation (de-
noted as z′) equals z. This is because Ao checks the con-
sistency by comparing c′b with ∏
n0
j=1 c
′
j · h∆r
′+r′o . When z is
“pass”, r′o is a pseudo-random number calculated using τob:
r′o = PRFτob(“rc”‖b‖date). In this case, ∆r′ + r′o = r′b − r′z
and the consistency check passes, indicating that z′ = “pass”.
When z is ⊥, ∆r′ is a random number and the consistency
check fails, indicating that z′ =⊥. In both cases, we can threat
the tuple (cb,∆r,C) (resp. (c′b,∆r
′,C′)) as the output of a ran-
domized function f which takes C (resp. C′) as input. Thus if
we can prove C ≈C′, we can get (cb,∆r,C)≈ (c′b,∆r′,C′).
It remains to show C ≈ C′. First, as So generates re-
sponses according to~v, we have~v = ~v′. Then we argue that
(c1,c2, . . . ,cn0)≈ (c′1,c′2, . . . ,c′n0). Actually, as these commit-
ments are generated independently using truely random num-
bers or pseudo-random numbers with seeds unknown by Ao,
the commitments are indistinguishable for Ao. Thus we have
C ≈C′ for Ao, which implies that (cb,∆r,C)≈ (c′b,∆r′,C′).
Finally, we take the borrower into account. As the borrower
receives no messages in Πauagg when treating anonymous au-
thorization as a functionality, the security for the borrower is
trival. We then consider an adversary Aob that corrupts both
the originator and the borrower. With the inputs from the
borrower, Aob can open the commitments from the lenders.
If the borrower has borrowed money from a lender Si, Aob
surely knows that the type of Si’s PIR response is type 0. But
if the borrower has not borrowed money from Si, we should
prove that our potocol protects the exact type of the PIR re-
sponse from Si. Actually, as the response is randomized in
Algorithm 1, Aob cannot distinguish the ciphertext of the re-
sponse from the ciphertexts generated by the exchanger. Thus
the exact type is still perturbed by the noise with differential
privacy.
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H.3 Security Proof of Octopus
Functionality FOctopus
Inputs: The borrower inputs a number xb. The originator
inputs a plaintext query q, a function f and a number t. Each
lender Si inputs its database Di.
Process:
1. For each lender Si, select a number xi using q. Calculate
x = ∑i xi.
2. Check that xb equals x. If the check fails, output a symbol
⊥ to the originator and abort.
3. Calculate y = f (xb; t) and output y to the originator.
PROTOCOL 4: Octopus protocol, ΠOctopus
a) The borrower and the originator call F f : the borrower
inputs a random number rb and a commitment cb, while
the originator inputs a function f and a number t.
b) Concurrently, all the participants call Fagg. The
commitment cb the borrower inputs to Fagg is the same as
the commitment sent to F f . The originator gets an
indicator z and a type count vector~v from Fagg.
c) If z is “pass”, the originator uses the output of F f as the
result. Otherwise, the originator aborts the execution and
outputs a symbol ⊥.
We finally define the functionality of Octopus as FOctopus,
and ΠOctopus depicts our final composed protocol. We also
use F f to represent the functionality of the specified eval-
uation function f , which is one of the functions for secure
evaluation described in Section 7. As the protocols for these
functions are existing approaches, we omit the analysis for
them in this paper, and focus on the composition of the above
functionalities. The common trait of the functions in Section 7
is that each of them uses a commitment which commits to xb
from the borrower as input. InΠOctopus,F f and Fagg share the
same commitment cb (this can be guaranteed in our protocol
as the originator receives cb in both Πauagg and the realization
of f ). Then we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5. ΠOctopus securely realizes FOctopus in the Fagg-
hybrid model in the presence of POctopus.
PROOF SKETCH: Correctness. If the participants behave
honestly, Fagg outputs “pass” to the originator and ΠOctopus
outputs the result of f to the originator. On the other hand,
Fagg and F f ensure that dishonest inputs from the borrower or
the originator would be detected without revealing sensitive
information from others.
Privacy. The output of ΠOctopus includes the output of Fagg
and F f . We have analyzed the privacy of the output of Fagg,
while the output of F f is exactly the originator wants to get
from the protocol, and no more information is revealed, which
gives the privacy.
Security. As ΠOctopus calls Fagg and F f , the borrower and
the lenders gets no output, while the exchanger and the origi-
nator get outputs from Fagg and F f . There is no intermediate
messages, and the construction of simulators is trival.
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